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Abstract
The Community must develop and integrate into regular use new toolsthat can assist analysts in
filtering and correlating the vast quantities of information that threaten to overwhelm the analytic
process…—Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United StatesRegarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction (The WMD Report)1Unlike the other social sciences and, particularly, the physical
sciences, where scientists get to choose the questions they wish to answer and experiments are
carefully designed to confirm or negate hypotheses, intelligence analysis requires analysts to deal
with thedemands of decision makers and estimate the intentions of foreign actors, criminals or
business competitors in an environment filled with uncertainty and even deliberate
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The Community must develop and integrate into regular use new tools 
that can assist analysts in filtering and correlating the vast quantities of 
information that threaten to overwhelm the analytic process…
—Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (The WMD Report)1
From the 9/11 Commission Report to the WMD Report to the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, there has been a renewed 
emphasis on an improvement in intelligence analysis and the tools and 
methods that analysts use to create their estimates. Congress, frustrated 
with recent intelligence failures that were linked, at least partially, to poor 
analysis, decided to legislate certain aspects of the analytic process by 
mandating the use of a method commonly called "Red Teaming" in the 
2004 Act:
Not later than 180 days after the effective date of this Act, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall establish a process and 
assign an individual or entity the responsibility for ensuring that, 
as appropriate, elements of the intelligence community conduct 
alternative analysis (commonly referred to as ''red-team analy-
sis'') of the information and conclusions in intelligence products.
—Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20042
This and other methods used routinely by intelligence analysts suffer 
from a number of problems. Unlike the other social sciences and, particu-
larly, the physical sciences, where scientists get to choose the questions 
they wish to answer and experiments are carefully designed to confirm or 
negate hypotheses, intelligence analysis requires analysts to deal with the 
demands of decision makers and estimate the intentions of foreign actors, 
criminals or business competitors in an environment filled with uncer-
tainty and even deliberate deception. For these reasons, those unfamiliar 
with the challenges of this discipline often criticize intelligence analysis 
methods:
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It's time to require national security analysts to assign numerical 
probabilities to their professional estimates and assessments as 
both a matter of rigor and of record. Policymakers can't weigh the 
risks associated with their decisions if they can't see how confi-
dent analysts are in the evidence and conclusions used to justify 
those decisions. The notion of imposing intelligence accountabil-
ity without intelligent counting—without numbers—is a fool's 
errand.
—Michael Schrage, Senior Advisor To MIT's Security Studies 
Program3
Scientists base their criticisms on a deep understanding of the power of 
statistics. Traditional statistics—the kind of statistics that one commonly 
studies in undergraduate or graduate programs—is based largely on nor-
mal distributions, structured data sets, linear regression analysis, null 
hypothesis testing and the like. It produces stunning results and is 
responsible for many of the advances in the hard and soft sciences.
This type of analysis, on the other hand, is normally considered inappro-
priate for intelligence analysis. The data collected for intelligence analysis 
are largely unstructured, often incomplete or deceptive, and rarely capa-
ble of interpretation by these scientifically acceptable methods. Even the 
most quantitatively oriented analysts acknowledge that there are some, 
perhaps many, problems that do not lend themselves to numerical analy-
sis.4 One response to this issue is to claim that intelligence analysis is 
mere guesswork, unscientific and prone to massive failures.
Another response is to look for alternative structured methods, methods 
that have a basis in science but allow for the uncertainty of the traditional 
intelligence data set. One of the methods often recommended to analysts 
by the scientific community is to apply the statistical theory of the 19th 
century clergyman and mathematician, Thomas Bayes. Schrage recom-
mends Bayes Theorem and calls it a "powerful tool to weigh evidence."5 
Bruce Blair of the Center For Defense Information also advocates Bayes to 
the intelligence community and calls it a "rigorous approach."6
Bayes, a non-conformist Minister and a Fellow of the Royal Society, is 
largely remembered today for his work on non-traditional statistical 
problems.7 Specifically, the Bayesian Method depends "on taking some 
expression of your beliefs about an unknown quantity before the data was 
available and modifying them [the beliefs] in light of the [new] data."8 
Such an approach appears to have immediate applicability to intelligence 
problems. Previous analyses, or an analyst's own experience, often pro-
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vide an intuitive idea of the range of probabilities inherent in a particular 
problem. While Bayes has its detractors, the method provides the math 
that would allow analysts to update their current beliefs in a logically con-
sistent and scientifically defensible way.
The difficulty, as always, lies in the details.
People do not appear to be natural Bayesians, i.e. they do not seem to fol-
low Bayesian reasoning when making a decision.9 Furthermore, Bayes 
seems difficult to teach. It is generally considered to be "advanced" statis-
tics and, given the problem that many people (including intelligence ana-
lysts) have with traditional elementary probabilistic and statistical 
techniques, such a solution seems to require expertise not currently resi-
dent in the intelligence community or available only through expensive 
software solutions.
The intelligence community has toyed with Bayes before. In 1978, Nicolas 
Schweitzer reported on an experiment using Bayesian analysis.10 At the 
time, according to Schweitzer, the technique was already used extensively 
in imagery analysis and was thought (by no less than the then Director of 
Central Intelligence, William Colby) to have potential in political analysis. 
The experiment, in fact, confirmed the utility of Bayes in less technical 
analysis and despite several misgivings, including, among others, prob-
lems with data, problems over time and the potential for manipulation, 
Schweitzer pronounced the technique "a useful adjunct to traditional 
analysis."11 Despite this endorsement, Schrage's modern critique tracks 
well with one of the author's own experience: Most analysts have never 
heard of Thomas Bayes, much less possess the ability to apply his theories 
to non-technical analytic problems.
This paper reports on efforts to change that. Can Bayes be simplified such 
that it can be taught? More importantly, can Bayes be taught in such a 
way that entry-level analysts can use the method at any time and under 
any circumstances? This paper outlines a series of studies and experi-
ments over the last year that try to do just that and, based on those exper-
iments, suggests new lines of research that might well provide the 
answers to these problems.
Addressing the needs of junior analysts has never been as important as it 
is now. Due primarily to a hiring freeze in the 1990's, analysts inside the 
intelligence community tend to be either quite senior (and near retire-
ment) or quite junior (hired within the last five years). For example, if 
Congress allows the FBI to hire all of the analysts it needs to replace those 
retiring in 2007, approximately one third of its analysts would have less 
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than two years experience.12 If Bayes is a potential solution, then figuring 
out how to teach it to young analysts is a critical concern.
A Brief Introduction To Bayes
Formally, Bayes Theorem13 looks like this:
Where:
P(H|D) is the probability that the hypothesis is true given the data.
P(H) is the probability of the hypothesis being true.
P(D|H) is the probability of the data given that the hypothesis is true (hit 
rate).
P(NH) is the probability that the hypothesis is not true.
P(D|NH) is the probability of the data given that the hypothesis is not 
true (false positive).
For too many analysts this is inaccessible gobbledy-gook. It is, however, a 
fairly straightforward equation. Bayes Formula is based on conditional 
probabilities, that is the probability of an event happening given the prob-
ability of another event happening. For example, take a coin toss. The 
probability that a fair coin will land heads up is 50%, therefore making the 
chance that the coin will land tails up is also 50%. These two probabilities 
are the initial probabilities (which are P(H) and P(NH) in the formula 
above). We also know that no matter how many times we toss the coin, 
the chance that the coin will land heads up will always be 50%, no matter 
if the coin landed heads up in the previous toss or not. This makes P(D|H) 
and P(D|NH) both equal to 50%. Since the probability of a coin either 
being heads up or tails up does not change no matter how the coin landed 
previously, no updating is needed, therefore indicating that the condi-
tional probabilities will not change. Bayes Formula is able to take this into 
P(H)*P(D|H)
P(H|D) = 
(P(H)*P(D|H))+(P(NH)*P(D|NH))
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consideration and shows that the probability of a coin landing heads up 
will be the same as the initial probability of that coin landing heads up:
However, when the probabilities are not equal, Bayes Formula shows how 
the probability of an event happening can be affected by the probability of 
another event occurring.
In terms of intelligence, it starts with the quite normal idea that all ana-
lysts have a sense of the odds regarding their areas of responsibility. For 
example, if you asked an area expert what were the odds that two coun-
tries in his or her area of expertise would go to war in the next two years, 
that analyst could probably give you a pretty good ballpark estimate. (For 
example: "There is only a 10% chance that they would go to war.")
What happens, however, when a new piece of information comes in con-
cerning the two countries? All analysts, but particularly young or entry-
level analysts, run the risk of giving in to a number of possible cognitive 
biases. Two of the most common, for example, are vividness and recency 
biases. Both of these biases cause humans to give greater weight to vivid 
or recent events. Bayes, however, allows the analyst to rationally update 
his or her previous assessment in light of the new evidence by stating that 
the new probability that a particular hypothesis is correct (given new evi-
dence) is equal to the old probability multiplied by the odds that the new 
event was caused by that particular hypothesis. For example, imagine that 
an analyst receives a piece of information he or she assesses as having a 
90% likelihood of being accurate. The piece of evidence states that war 
between the two countries is now eminent, although the analyst had pre-
viously thought there was only a 10% chance. A non-Bayesian analyst 
might fall prey to a number of biases and over-react; however, a Bayesian 
analyst would update the probability of war using Bayes Theorem and 
(.5 *.5)
P(H|D) =
((.5 *.5) + (.5 *.5))
.25
P(H|D) =
.25+.25
.25
.50 =
.50
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realize that even with the new information, the real chance of war 
between the two countries is only 50–50.
While this may seem counterintuitive at first, as Schweitzer noted in 1978, 
"much of the acceptance of our current efforts is due to earlier experi-
ments applying Bayes to the analysis of historical intelligence situa-
tions."14 Bayes works, and for traditional intuitive style analysts, this is 
bad news. It gets worse, however.
Consider another example: this time, the classic example of the applica-
tion of Bayes, medical testing. Imagine a disease that exists in only 2% of 
the population and a test that has an 80% accuracy rate. Given a positive 
test, what is the likelihood that you actually have the disease? Only about 
7.5%. If this seems wrong to you, you are not alone. Many people, doctors 
included, allow biases to affect their judgment and would likely guess that 
receiving a positive test would indicate that the person had a high proba-
bility of having the disease, most likely very close to 80%. This is because 
people are influenced by the high accuracy rate of the test and do not take 
into consideration that only 2% of the population has the specific disease 
and that 20% of the time, the test incorrectly identifies someone as being 
positively diagnosed. In other words, where base rates are relatively low, 
it is easy for the number of false positives to overwhelm the number of 
true positives. When these base rates and false positives are taken into 
consideration, as is done in Bayes Formula, the answer is more accurate.
Natural Frequencies
Most people do not see how the above example works. Health profession-
als, from doctors to counselors, routinely make incorrect assessments of 
probability when confronted with these types of problems. Moreover, the 
bulk of previous research (as cited earlier) suggests that there is little that 
anyone can do about the average human's inability to take the base rate of 
occurrence into account when assessing probabilities. Bayes is cognitively 
challenging and even disconcerting; therefore, a user-friendly way that 
helps people understand would be extremely useful (in much the same 
that Sudoku is capable of getting people to perform matrix algebra by hav-
ing them play a game that is easily understood and fun).
Enter Gigenrenzer. Gerd Gigenrenzer, a professor of psychology at the 
Free University of Berlin, along with a number of collaborators, hypothe-
sized that the reason humans did so poorly on tests of their Bayesian rea-
soning skills was that the problems had been expressed in terms of 
traditional statistics.15 He believed that traditional statistical thinking was 
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a skill that only some humans acquired and thus was not natural for most 
humans. He extended this logic one further step: What if you use natural 
frequencies (e.g. "5 times out of 100") instead of traditional statistical for-
mulations (e.g. 5%) in framing the problem? Will this help people be bet-
ter Bayesian reasoners?
Psychologists have known for years that "framing" is a powerful tool for 
eliciting predictable responses from individuals. Particularly egregious 
examples pop up during every election, of course, but even innocuous and 
mathematically equivalent statements yield startlingly different results 
when framed as a loss or a gain.16 Beyond mere framing effects, however, 
Gigenrenzer and his collaborators posed a hypothesis founded in the eco-
logical thesis that posits that if the mind has evolved to reason in the 
Bayesian manner, it is likely "tuned" to natural frequencies.17 Gigenrenzer 
sought to use these phenomena to overcome the perceived inability of 
humans to use Bayesian reasoning.
Gigenrenzer and his collaborator, Ulrich Hoffrage, tested two groups of 
doctors. In the first case, Gigenrenzer presented a problem (similar to the 
one described above) to one group of doctors using traditional statistical 
expressions. The doctors did quite poorly and these results tracked with 
numerous earlier studies of Bayesian reasoning. In the second group, 
Gigenrenzer used natural frequencies—and the results were startling. 
Framing the question with natural frequencies led doctors to score signif-
icantly better on the test of their Bayesian skills.18
Testing Analysts
This breakthrough obviously has significant potential meaning for the use 
of Bayes in intelligence analysis. If natural frequencies allow at least some 
people to become better Bayesians, maybe such a result could be the foun-
dation for teaching and applying Bayes to entry-level intelligence ana-
lysts.
There are substantial differences between doctors and intelligence ana-
lysts, however. Doctors are, by and large, steeped in the scientific method 
and are arguably much more familiar (not to mention comfortable) with 
mathematics in general and statistics in particular than are most intelli-
gence analysts. In addition, because of the competitive nature and lengthy 
education involved in becoming a doctor, it is likely that most doctors are 
older, better educated and more mature than the entry-level analysts that 
need to be targeted by any Bayesian educational process for intelligence 
analysis. In short, in order to ensure that natural frequencies might prove 
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useful in educating intelligence analysts about Bayes, it seemed that the 
first step was to repeat Gigenrenzer's study with these young analysts.
Finding a group of young analysts could have proven difficult. Many ana-
lysts require security clearances, and those in classified positions are both 
difficult to engage as a group and are not typically encouraged to partici-
pate in experiments. Fortunately, at Mercyhurst College there exists a 
large group of potentially testable subjects. Mercyhurst offers the only 
residential, 4-year degree program in Applied Intelligence Studies in the 
world. Students participate in a rigorous curriculum (that begins in their 
first year) designed to prepare them for positions as analysts in the 
national security, business and law enforcement intelligence communi-
ties. Students in the program will normally have participated in numerous 
real world intelligence projects or simulations of real world intelligence 
projects and are routinely required to produce high quality open source 
intelligence products as part of their normal class work. All undergradu-
ates and many graduate students have internships with agencies and 
organizations within the intelligence community before they graduate. 
Because of this preparation, virtually all of the graduates of this program 
are employed within a year by some sector of the intelligence community 
and, in a typical class, 60–70% of these students will go to work some-
where in the national security community as intelligence analysts. By the 
time they are seniors, they are, by all relevant measures, experienced 
intelligence analysts without the clearance.
As part of an ordinary classroom exercise, 67 senior intelligence studies 
students at Mercyhurst were asked to answer two different questions, 
similar to the ones posed earlier. As with Gigenrenzer's experiment, one 
used standard statistical terminology (terminology with which all 
Mercyhurst Intelligence Studies students are familiar as statistics is part 
of the required course load) while the other group received a similar ques-
tion using natural frequencies. Unlike Gigenrenzer's experiment, the 
questions imagined a hypothetical intelligence situation rather than a 
medical one. The question that utilized standard statistical terminology 
posed a question about the chances of a country going to war based on a 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) report, while the natural frequency question 
asked about the chances of someone being a spy within the intelligence 
community based on the results of a special test. Both questions were 
structured identically to Gigenrenzer's questions.
There was a statistically significant (alpha=.05) difference between the 
traditional statistics group and the natural frequency group. Twenty six of 
33 (79%) students fell within 10 points of the correct answer19 in the natu-
ral frequency group while only 6 of 34 (18%) analysts got that close in the 
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traditional statistics group. These results (see charts below) strongly sug-
gest that natural frequencies do, in fact, allow intelligence analysts to be 
better Bayesians (see statistical annex for additional details). The results 
from the natural frequencies group tracks exactly (and almost certainly 
serendipitously) with Gigenrenzer's own findings: 19 of 24 doctors (79%) 
fell within 10 points of the correct answer.
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In order to determine if there were any pre-existing differences between 
the two subject groups (doctors and analysts) we also compared the doc-
tors who had the problem expressed in traditional statistical terms and 
the analysts who had a similar problem articulated in traditional statisti-
cal terms. While there was a difference in the number of individuals who 
came within 10 points of the correct answer (33% of doctors vs. 18% of 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2  No. 1
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss1/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.1.3Teaching Bayesian Statistics To Intelligence Analysts: Lessons Learned
49
analysts) this difference, contrary to our initial concerns, was not signifi-
cant (alpha=.05; see statistical annex for additional details), suggesting 
that analysts who are about to complete the Mercyhurst program are at 
least as comfortable as doctors with statistically based reasoning.
Conclusion and Next Steps
This report on an ongoing research program suggests that intelligence 
analysts may well be better able to handle Bayesian style reasoning than 
expected from previous studies of people in other disciplines if natural 
frequencies are used. The studies conducted extend, and, to a certain 
extent, generalize previous findings that natural frequencies are an effec-
tive method for encouraging Bayesian reasoning.
If analysts, using natural frequencies, can learn Bayes, as this exercise 
suggests, what are the next steps? Gigenrenzer himself explored a number 
of possibilities but they all seem too complicated for day-to-day use by 
young analysts, some of whom are forward deployed in combat zones. 
Such analysts need a simple, quick procedure; something that could be 
done on the back of an envelope and learned in an afternoon. In comput-
erized form, such a program would have to be lightweight and user 
friendly, perhaps an extension to Mozilla's Firefox20 or a lightweight piece 
of specially designed software such as XeroxPARC's ACH 2.0.3.21
Fortunately, such efforts are ongoing. One of the co-authors of this article 
is pursuing thesis research along these precise lines and Mercyhurst has 
undertaken a joint project with Penn-State Behrend to develop a standal-
one program that integrates open source information in real-time into a 
software package that allows analysts to make Bayesian-like decisions on 
the fly. As Schweizer stated almost 30 years ago, "Bayesian analysis is a 
method of extracting more information than usual from evidence, and of 
encouraging analysts to consider alternative explanations of that evi-
dence"22 and this ongoing research program hopes to bring the benefits of 
this powerful tool closer to the reach of the entry-level analyst.
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Statistical Annex:
1.   Is there a significant difference between the Traditional Sta-
tistics Group and the Natural Frequencies Group?
Hypothesis Statements:
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference between using the traditional sta-
tistics language approach and using the natural frequency approach.
Alternate Hypothesis: There is a significant difference between using the 
traditional statistics language approach and using the natural frequency 
approach. (Claim)
Assumption Checking:
For both groups the sample size is large (30 or more).
Independent samples as different approach used for each sample/data 
set.
Decision is to use Z-distribution two-hypothesis test.
Analysis:
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Z-test value = 3.183
P-value = 0.002
P-value = 0.002 is smaller than level of significance of 0.05, thus reject 
the null hypothesis.
Conclusion:
At the 5% level, there is a significant difference between using the tradi-
tional statistics language approach and using the natural frequency 
approach.
2. Is there a significant difference between the first Doctor data 
set and the first Intel Studies data set for the Traditional 
Statistics Language?
Hypothesis Statements:
Null hypothesis: There is no difference between the Doctor data set and 
the Intel Studies data set for the Traditional Statistics Language used in 
Bayesian problems.
Alternative hypothesis: There is a significant difference between the 
Doctor data set and the Intel Studies data set for the Traditional Statistics 
Language used in Bayesian problems. (Claim)
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Assumption Checking:
Sample size for Doctor data is small (less than 30).
Samples are independent as the data is collected from two different pro-
fessions.
Normality assumption check:
Null: The variable is normally distributed.
Alternative: The variable is not normally distributed.
From Kolmogorov-Smirnov column from above output table, for both the 
samples P-values are less than 0.05. Thus reject the null hypothesis. Thus 
the normality assumption is not satisfied. But normality is robust thus 
time is to check for the plots.
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Both the Normal Q-Q plots show that most of the points are close to the 
diagonal line. Thus the assumption of normality is satisfied for the sam-
ples.
Note that for the doctor data few points (lower left) look as if they are 
away from the line. But if you look at the vertical axis scale, it really does 
not matter.
Decision is to use t-distribution independent two-hypothesis test.
Analysis:
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In order to decide the t-test value, we need to see if the equal variance 
assumption is satisfied.
Null: The variances are equal.
Alternative: The variances are not equal.
From above output table, according to Levene's test, P-value is 0.920. It is 
larger than level of significance of 0.05. Thus fail to reject the null hypoth-
esis.
Thus variances are equal at 5% level.
t-test value = 1. 634
P-value = 0.108
P-value = 0.108 is larger than level of significance of 0.05 thus fail to 
reject the null hypothesis.
Conclusion:
There is no difference between Doctor data set and the Intel Studies data 
set for the Traditional Statistics Language used in Bayesian problems at 
5% level.
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21   ACH 2.0.3 is a lightweight, user-friendly piece of software developed by 
XeroxPARC and designed to partially automate the Analysis Of Competing 
Hypotheses method of intelligence analysis. The software is available for download 
from http://www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html.
22   Heuer, op. cit., 11.
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